

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7188

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4451

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WORKING GROUP PAPER ON IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED
ALLIED DATA

REF: A. USNATO 4236

B. USNATO 4310

C. USNATO 4450

1. HERewith NEW DRAFT OF SUBJECT PAPER REVISED FOLLOWING
AUGUST 14 WG MEETING (DETAILS, REF C). (PREVIOUS DRAFT REF A AS
AMENDED REF B). US POINT THAT FINDINGS SHOULD BE DELETED IS
REFLECTED IN INTRODUCTORY PARA. PARA 5 REF A IS DELETED AS
REDUDANT AND SUBSEQUENT PARAS RENUMBERED. PARA 6B REDRAFTED TO
CORRESPOND MORE CLOSELY TO LANGUAGE ON SECOND PAHSE IN C-M (73)83
(REVISED), AT SUGGESTION OF DUTCH. FOOTNOTE TO PARA 12
DEALS WITH UK POINT. PHRASE "WOULD POSSIBLY BE ACCEPTABLE"
IN PARA 15 ALSO DESIGNED TO MEET UK POINT (SEE PARA 10 REF C).
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BRACKETS IN PARA 17 REFLECT US- UK DISAGREEMENT DESCRIBED
PARAS 6 AND 7 REF C.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON NEW DRAFT BY AUGUST 27.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

SUBJECT: MBFR : IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED DATA FOR NATO AND WP MANPOWER.

REF: SITCEN 0701 DTGR 0715502

AS REQUIRED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP AT THEIR MEETING ON 14 AUGUST THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS TEXT OF THE SIGNAL UNDER REFERENCE. IT INCLUDES, INTER ALIA, AMENDMENTS TO THE FINDINGS LISTED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT; HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT SOME DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH COVERING FINDINGS SHOULD BE DELETED FROM THE TEXT. THE SUBJECT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA OF THE MBFR WG MEETING ON 27 AUGUST, WHEN IT IS HOPED FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT REPORT WILL BE REACHED.

TEXT BEGINS:

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED DATA FOR NATO AND WP
MANPOWER
INTRODUCTION

1. THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAVE REQUESTED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS OF NATO AND WP MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, AS PRESENTED IN MID-1974, (AC/276-D(74)6))(1).

A. (1) REVISED (INCREASED) ASSESSMENTS OF THE GROUND MANPOWER TOTALS FOR BOTH NATO AND THE WP, AS COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS FIGURES (AC/276-D(74)5//AC/276-D(70)3).

(2) ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES, NOT HITHERTO AVAILABLE.

(3) ASSESSMENTS, WITHIN THE GROSS TOTALS AT (1) AR (2) OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN WP FORCES EMPLOYED IN SSM AND HELICOPTER UNITS.

B. THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE STATUS
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OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, THE MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT IS TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN ASSESSMENTS OF GROSS MANPOWER STRENGTHS FOR GROUND FORCES. THIS NOTE THEREFORE DEALS ONLY WITH THAT ASPECT. CONSIDERATION OF THE AR MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS WILL FOLLOW IN DUE COURSE.

BACKGROUND

2. THE MID-1974 FIGURES RECENTLY ADDUCED (AC/276-D(74)6) FOR NATO AND WP FORCES SHOW AN INCREASE OVER THOSE PREVIOUSLY USED (AC/276-D(74)5) FOR MBFR PURPOSES. BECAUSE OF THIS INCREASE THE WORKING GROUP HAVE BEEN ASKED TO STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LATEST FIGURES.

(1) FIGURES ARE NOT NATO AGREED.

3. THE TWO SETS OF FIGURES COMPARE, FOR GROUND FORCES ONLY,
AS FOLLOWS:

	OCT 73	MID-1974	DIFFERENCE
NATO	777,000	791,000	PLUS 14,000
WP	925,000	952,000	PLUS 27,000

FORM OF PAPER

4. THIS PAPER IS IN TWO PRINCIPAL PARTS:

- A. A RESTATEMENT OF NATOS BASIC POSITION ON THE SIZE OF
NATOS REDUCTIONS.
- B. AN INDICATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS RAISED BY THE USE OF
THE NEW FIGURES.

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NATO'S BASIC POSITION

5. NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES AS DESCRIBED IN C-M (73)83(FINAL).

A. UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE.

B. UNDIMINISHED NATO ABILITY TO MEET THE STRATEGIC
REQUIREMENTS OF FORWARD DEFENCE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AND NUCLEAR

DETERRENCE.

C. APPROXIMATE PARITY OF FORCES AFTER REDUCTIONS.

D. REDUCTIONS TO BE IN TWO PHASES STARTING WITH US/
SOVIET FORCES.

E. A MAXIMUM 10PCT REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER.

F. REDUCTION IN NATOS COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT
TO A MINIMUM, THE CONVERSE APPLIES TO THE WP.

G. ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS
ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TO ENHANCE
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WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD UP.

H. COLLATERAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A
REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

THE RATIONALE FOR THESE NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES IS THAT THE POTENTIAL
THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE WILL REMAIN LITTLE CHANGED BY SOVIET
WITHDRAWALS. THE WITHDRAWN FORCES COULD BE RE-INTRODUCED
RAPIDLY AND THE THREAT WOULD BE REDUCED IN TIME RATHER THAN IN
QUANTITY. EFFICIENT MOBILISATION SCHEMES MUST EXIST TO ENSURE A
RAPID BUILD UP OF NATO FORCES TO COMBAT STRENGTH AND READINESS.

6. NATOS REDUCTION PROPOSALS FOR PHASE I IN SUMMARY ARE:

A. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY
(5 DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT) AND THE US
WOULD WITHDRAW AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER OF ITS STATIONED
FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD MEAN REDUCTION OF 15PCT ON BOTH
SIDES, OR ABOUT 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS
PLUS 1,700 TANKS AND ABOUT 29,000 US SOLDIERS (C-M(73)83(FINAL)).

B. INCLUSION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING
FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR AGREEMENT TO THE
CONCEPT OF A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING. ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THIS
SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NON US NATO FORCES. THE
LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING WOULD BE ILLUSTRATED TO THE SOVIETS AS
"ABOUT 700,000" MEN.

IMPLICATIONS OF PHASE I OF REVISED FIGURES FOR SOVIET STRENGTHS

7. THE REVISED FIGURES FOR SOVIET GROUND FORCES, AND INCREASE
FROM 460,000 TO 477,000, ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO PHASE I, AS
PROPOSED BY NATO, BECAUSE THE INTENTION IS THAT SOVIET GROUND
FORCES SHOULD REDUCE BY A TANK ARMY, 68,000 (ABOUT) RATHER THAN BY A
PERCENTAGE. HOWEVER, A REDUCTION OF 68,000 PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT
NEARLY 15PCT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD NOW WORK OUT AT A LITTLE
UNDER 14 PCT.

CALCULATION OF THE COMMON CEILING

8. A SERIES OF STUDIES AND PAPERS (AC/276-D(72)6-"US APPROACH
TO MBFR" USNATO (PM)/OUT/NS/73, 30 APR 73- USNATO -CTS-73-8 OF
2 JULY 73- SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S64/73 OF 19 JUL 73- SHAPE 1000.1/20

5/1/S109/73 OF 29 AUG 73- C-M(73)83(FINAL)) STATED THAT NATO REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10PCT.

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9. THE DATA FIRST PRODUCED FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARRIVED AT A TOTAL FOR NATO GROUND FORCES OF 777,000 MEN. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A 10PCT REDUCTION PRODUCED THE RESULT OF A "COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 700,000" AND A NATO REDUCTION OF 77,000 MEN.

10. MILITARILY, THEREFORE, THE TARGET OF A COMMON CEILING AT ABOUT 700,000 WAS REACHED THROUGH A REDUCTION OF 10PCT OF THE ASSESSED GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS FOR NATO. APPLYING THE SAME PRINCIPLE AND A 10 PCT REDUCTION TO THE LATEST AVAILABLE FIGURES (AC/276-D(74)6) POSTULATES A "COMMON CEILING AT A LEVEL NOT BELOW 712,000" AND A NATO REDUCTION OF 79,000 MEN.

IMPLICATIONS OF RETAINING A COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 700,000

11. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT FORMULATION, AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE TARGET, OF A COMMON CEILING AT "ABOUT 700,000" AS ANNOUNCED IN VIENNA NEED NOT BE CHANGED. THIS ALLOWS FOR FLEXIBILITY, INEVITABLE IN ANY CASE IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, SUFFICIENT TO ABSORB A DEVIATION IN THE ORDER OF 12,000 MEN. MOREOVER, THE ACTUAL CEILING WILL ONLY BE ESTABLISHED AFTER AGREEMENT IS REACHED AS TO THE PRECISE REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, WERE IT PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A STRICT CEILING OF 700,000 MEN AND ASSUMING THE PRESENT NATO FIGURE OF 791,000 MEN HOLDS, THIS WOULD RESULT IN NATO REDUCTIONS OF 91,000 MEN OR ABOUT 11.5PCT (77,000 MEN WERE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED).

12. SHAPE HAS STATED, INTER ALIA, (SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-1/S110/73 PARA 7) THAT "A REDUCTION OF 10PCT OF A NATION'S FORCES COULD BE ASSIMILATED PARTLY BY THIN OUT AND CUTS IN LOGISTIC ELEMENTS TO ENSURE THE MINIMUM LOSS OF READY COMBAT CAPABILITY. A LARGER PERCENTAGE WOULD HAVE A PROGRESSIVELY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE NUMBER OF COMBAT UNITS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN OR DISBANDED (1)." THEREFORE, IF NATO REDUCTIONS ARE INCREASED FROM 77,000 TO 91,000 MEN, THE RESULT COULD BE THAT NATO WOULD LOSE AS MUCH AS 14,000 MEN FROM COMBAT UNITS, WHICH COULD REPRESENT THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF TWO REINFORCED BRIGADES OR TWO THIRDS OF A DIVISION.

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13. SINCE NOTHING IS YET KNOWN OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTIONS BETWEEN NATO NATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, AT THIS STAGE, TO STATE THE EXACT IMPLICATIONS OF NATO REDUCING BY 91,000 MEN, RATHER THAN BY 77,000. WHAT CAN BE

SAID, WITH SOME CERTAINTY, IS THAT ANY REDUCTION ABOVE 10PCT WOULD FALL INCREASINGLY HEAVILY ON NATOS COMBAT TROOPS WHICH ARE, IN THE VIEW OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, ALREADY MARGINAL FOR THE FRONTIERS AND TERRITORIES THEY DEFEND AND FOR THE TASKS REQUIRED OF THEM WITH THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND DETERRENCE. SUCH FURTHER REDUCTIONS CONSIDERED ALONE COULD ONLY EIMINISH NATOS SECURITY.

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IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 712,000

14. THE MBFR WG FULLY RECOGNISE AND OF COURSE SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE COMMON CIELING TO BE ADOPTED SHOULD NOT INVOLVE A REDUCTION OF MORE THAN 10PCT IN NATO GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO RECOGNISE THAT THE PRESENT FIGURE OF 791,000 COULD PERHAPS

(1) SOME DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES OTHER THAN THOSE MENTIONED BY SHAPE FOR ASSIMULATION AND/OR DISPOSITION OF REDUCTIONS.

CHANGE DURING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS OR THAT IT COULD BE ALTERED IN THE PROCESS OF ADDRESSING CERTAIN ANOMALIES IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE TWO SIDES. THIS IS THE SUBJECT OF A PRALLEL STUDY. ALSO, AS INDICATED IN PARA 11 ABOVE, THEY ARE AWARE THAT THE PHRASE "ABOUT 700,000" IS INTENDED TO BE ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY
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AND SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS IMPLYING A PRECISE FIGURE. FOR THESE REASONS, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW THERE IS NO NEED AT THE PRESENT TIME TO ADOPT OR TO GIVE TO THE OTHER SIDE A NEW FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING. A FULL EXAMINATION OF A REVISED CEILING MAY EVENTUALLY BE REQUIRED.

15. SUCH A CEILING OF 712,000 MEN WOULD MEAN THAT ACTUAL REDUCTIONS COMPARED WITH THE REDUCTIONS FORESEEN WHEN THE ALLIES FIRST TABLED THEIR PROPOSALS WOULD INCREASE FROM 77,000 TO 79,000 MEN. THIS REDUCTION OF AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 MEN, BORNE ACROSS THE NATO FORCES IN THE NGA, WOULD POSSIBLY BE ACCEPTABLE.

FURTHER STUDIES

16. WHEN MORE DETAIL IS KNOWN OF HOW FINAL REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE DIVIDED BETWEEN ALL THE NATO NATIONS CONCERNED IT IS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER AND MORE DETAILED STUDIES WOULD BE NEEDED.

IMPLICATIONS OF ASSESSED INCREASE IN WP GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS

17. THE ASSESSED INCREASE IN WP GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS FROM 925,000 TO 952,000 WOULD MEAN, IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 THAT THE WP WOULD NOW BE ASKED TO REDUCE BY MORE THAN 25PCT. AT A COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 712,000 THE WP WOULD BE ASKED TO REDUCE BY 240,000 OR ABOUT 25PCT, COMPARED TO REDUCTIONS OF 24.3PCT UNDER THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE. IN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL THE WP HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE BY ABOUT 16PCT PROVIDED NATO WILL REDUCE BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE. THE WORKING GROUP WISHES TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WP SPOKESMEN HAVE INDICATED IN VIENNA THAT THE RECENT NATO ESTIMATE OF WP OVERALL STRENGTHS (925,000) WAS TOO HIGH. (THE WP IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS MAY THEREFORE PRODUCE AN APPRECIABLY SMALLER FIGURE AT IT MIGHT BE VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE THAT OUR FIGURES ON PACT FORCES ARE CORRECT AND THEREFORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER SIDE. THIS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING SIGNIFICANTLY THE CURRENT NATO ESTIMATES OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO BLOCs). (BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS NECESSARILY A MARGIN OF ERROR IN NATO'S ASSESSMENTS OF WP MANPOWER STRENGTHS, AND UNTIL THERE IS AN ACCEPTANCE OF WP MANPOWER FIGURES, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW MANY MEN THE WP WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE TO REACH ANY COMMON CEILING).

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FINDINGS

18. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. THE LEVEL OF ANY COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE THE PRODUCT OF A REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER NOT EXCEEDING 10PCT, I.E. THE SCALE OF REDUCTIONS CONSIDERED

TO BE THE MAXIMUM CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

B. THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE MANPOWER ESTIMATES FOR NATO GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF REFINEMENT OF FIGURES AND CERTAIN CHANGES IN NATIONAL MANNING FEATURES. FURTHER FLUCTUATIONS IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS COULD DERIVE FROM ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO REDUCE ANOMALIES (SEE AGV(74)65).

C. THE HYPOTHETICAL COMMON CEILING TARGET SHOULD THEREFORE VARY AS THE PERCENTAGE OF NATO REDUCTIONS IS APPLIED TO NEW ASSESSMENTS OF GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED.

D. INTRODUCTION OF THE REVISED NATO MANPOWER ASSESSMENTS AS PRESENTED IN MID-1974(AC/276-D(74)6) SHOULD POSTULATE A COMMON CEILING TARGET NOT BELOW 712,000. HOWEVER, THE VARIATION (12,000) FROM THE EXISTING DECLARED TARGET (ABOUT 700,000) WOULD FALL WITHIN REASONABLE FLUCTUATIONS, INEVITABLE IN THE COURSE OF PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS ON THAT DECLARED FIGURE. THE PRESENT ANNOUNCED FORMULATION OF THE COMMON CEILING AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE TARGET AT "ABOUT 700,000" COULD THEREFORE BE RETAINED, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

E. UNTIL THERE IS ACCEPTANCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RELEVANT DATA ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW MANY MEN THE WP AND NATO WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE TO REACH A COMMON CEILING. END TEXT. MCAULIFFE

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